This started out as a little teeny paragraph in response to Reader Kate's comments in this post, and then grew because I fed it some Wheaties, so I just went with it
I've recently discovered that a good way to avoid the trap of endless references supporting or denying the evilness of Dubya is to think more in terms of principles and policies, rather than individual personalities. Thus, it becomes a matter of a) whether the principles and policies are sound and b) if so, whether this or that person is acting according to that principle or properly executing that policy. I was being a bit flip about Clinton's "mulligan" comment, but my flipitude is rooted in certain beliefs about the use of force and the nature of diplomacy.
Reader Kate writes,
Ranking "action" (i.e., military action) over diplomacy is also tricky business...
Often, yes, but not in this case.
Al-Qaeda doesn't have an embassy in Washington, and neither do the other organizations that form the core of Islamic theocratic fascism. That changes the rules. The other Arab countries do have embassies, of course, but the citizens that actively support and finance al-Qaeda and other groups are not necessarily at the beck and call of their national diplomatic corps, and, in many cases, are part of the diplomatic corps or of the ruling governments.
In any case, diplomacy without credible threat of force is just empty rhetoric, and always has been. Think about it: if you're negotiating with someone and you know that if you refuse all of their demands they can't or won't actually do anything about it, are you more or less inclined to meet their demands?
Similarly, if you decide to threaten someone with a proven track record of not responding to threats with suitable force, are you more emboldened, or less?
I believe that diplomacy between adversaries is not an end in itself; and that effective diplomacy is always backed up by an implied credible threat of force.
That's why the UN is the ineffective organization that it is: those who defy it know that nothing will come of it. That's exactly what Hussein did for 12 years. And the House of Saud has been relying on our own supposed impotence in the face of its economic clout for decades.
Reader Kate also asks,
Many of the countries (including NK) that have developed or are developing nukes have done so because they know it will make them largely invulnerable to the type of incursion we made in Iraq. I have seen KIS quoted as saying as much. So do our 'pre-emptive' policies help us or hurt us?
Well, the current major nuclear powers--in order of number of warheads--are Russia, the US, China, France, and the United Kingdom. Russia was worried about us, but probably isn't, now. China is still worried about us a bit, but was probably more worried about us in the past.
Other nuclear powers include Israel, which is justifiably worried about its neighbors, and India and Pakistan, who are more worried about each other. South Africa was clearly worried about something at some point, because it had a nuclear weapons program at one time, but it dismantled the program with full public disclosure of the process. Iran is working on nukes, and it might justifiably fear an American invasion, but was probably far more worried about Iraq when it started its program. By and large, it seems, the "new" nuclear powers developed their weapons in reponse to regional, rather than global threats.
As far as North Korea goes, of course they want nuclear capability. With it, they can invade South Korea with impunity, and even threaten Japan (which is, by the way, also considering a nuclear program in response to regional security concerns). Despite their insanely bombastic rhetoric, I don't believe that the North Korean government wants nuclear capability just to fend off supposed American aggression; they want it to back up their own aggression, supposedly free from the threat of an American response. It's also important to remember that in 1994, the Clinton administration brokered a diplomatic agreement with North Korea under which the North Koreans were to freeze their nuclear weapons development program. Diplomacy, in this case, failed completely. The North Korean government took billions of American dollars and continued on with their program.
Do we want to let them continue to do so? It's not that we'd attack North Korea "just because;" we'd attack because their leadership is composed of Stalinst homicidal lunatics who, if they had the means, would threaten the entire population of Southeast Asia. More to the point: it's not really America they have to worry about. It's China, which would have far fewer compunctions than America about just blowing the hell out of everything north of the 38th parallel.
Except for the importance of China as a key player in the region--and a nuclear one at that--the Korean situation is analogous to Iraq. Even ignoring the possibility of weapons provision to non-state terrorist entities: do we allow Hussein to wait until the UN inevitably lifts the sanctions, and sit back and watch as he and his sons funnel vast oil revenues into sophisticated nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons programs? We know that he would do this, because he maintained the programs in a stand-by state even while under sanction, using money provided by the UN's ineptly administered "oil-for food" program.
A nuclear-armed Iraq would mean a near-unfettered ability to sweep across the entire Arabian penninsula, with, it should be noted, significant support from a culture that feels itself humiliated and craves the respect it believes such nuclear strength will gain it.
Quite simply, that wouldn't be good for anyone in the world.
Hussein embarked on that very campaign in '91 without nukes, and it wasn't because, as various conspiracy sites would have us believe, ambassador April Glaspie gave him a "green light." He did it because it was in his nature to do so.
The harsh truth is that the destructive technologies now present in this world mean that we can no longer let certain kinds of foreign leaders follow their natures. It's not safe for us, and it's not safe for the rest of the world.
The kind of leaders we're concerned about are precisely the kind of leaders who don't respond to anything but credible threat of force or, failing that, actual use of force. Hussein's megalomania allowed him to hold off the soft diplomacy of the UN for a dozen years because he bet that the US--as always, the potent fist in the UN's weak glove--wouldn't get involved again. And, if 9/11 never happened, we probably wouldn't have gotten involved, much to our regret in another decade or so.
But 9/11 did happen. Contrary to the tinfoil hat brigade's assertions, we didn't wallop Hussein because the Bush administration claimed or even believed that he assisted with that specific operation. We walloped him because he was the key to avoiding future catastrophe in the region and here in the US. By taking out someone who never responded to diplomacy anyway, we have firmly established the credible threat of force that will drive successful diplomacy with the other states in the region that offer support to non-state terrorist organizations. And, if diplomacy fails: we're right next door.
As a final example of the difference between diplomacy and use of force, consider this: in 2002, there were 199 international terrorist attacks (i.e., attacks involving the citizens and/or land of more than one country.)
That's the fewest number of attacks in 20 years, and drop of 43% from the previous year; it's also 27% fewer attacks than the lowest number of attacks during the Clinton administration (274 in 1998). I suggest that this precipitous drop wasn't the result of diplomacy.
Further, I suggest that it was the result of Dubya's actions. Because of this, I support him in his admittedly flawed execution of a particular policy I agree with: don't wait until an obviously growing threat becomes imminent or actual before dealing with it. I also support any actions he takes that that are in accordance with a particular principle I believe to be worthy of upholding: a credible threat of force is a necessary precursor to any attempt at diplomacy in general and in the Middle East in particular.
Similarly, I believe that with regard to these policies and principles, Clinton failed.
Three observations. The first observation is with respect to your argument against waiting "until an obviously growing threat becomes imminent or actual before dealing with it." I have serious problems with this. The issue of what constitutes an "obviously growing" threat is clearly the lynchpin of this assertion, and it is an absolutely critical point when the consequence of the assessment is carrying out a new and extremely aggresive policy (preemption) in one of the most politically unstable regions in the world. The danger in this policy is that a claimed threat will be rhetorically inflated to "obviously growing" status to justify the geopolitical goals of those in power.
The argument that the threat represented by Iraq was "obviously growing" is strongly questionable. The Bush administration did in fact argue an IMMINENT threat to U.S. security from Iraq, using assertions of intelligence demonstrated by increasing evidence to have been heavily spun if not simply erroneous.
Since the invasion of Iraq not one of the foundation claims on which the justification for war was based has been vindicated by evidence. Where is the anthrax capable of killing millions of people? The botulinum toxin, the stockpiles of VX and sarin nerve gas? Where is the nuclear weapons program, outside of unsubstantiated and debunked reports of Iraq seeking uranium from Africa and aluminum tubes known to be unsuitable for manufacturing fissile material?
This forms the basis of a very reasonable argument that the Administration's presentation of the threat represented by Iraq was, in the most optimistic and generous assessment, inflated. Is it possible to go on and demonstrate a preexistant policy goal of the invasion of Iraq? We can in fact demonstrate a proven tendency in the so-called neoconservative movement to argue for a policy of preemption in general and the invasion of Iraq in particular going back well over a decade (I highly reccomend the Christian Science Monitor's assessment of neoconservativism for a basis of understanding of the individuals and ideologies that are shaping the USA's international policy right now - http://www.csmonitor.com/specials/neocon/index.html ). So it is at the least reasonable to argue the position that what the invasion of Iraq represents is the exploitation of the emotional impact of the September 11 terrorist attacks, combined with questionably interpreted intelligence, to pursue a goal that preexisting and unrelated military goal in Iraq.
The second observation relates to the value of diplomacy (or the lack thereof). Denying the basic potential for effectiveness of international diplomacy completely ignores the reality that under the terms defined through the UN after the expulsion of Iraq from Kuwait, mediated through UN Weapons inspectors, Iraq's chemical, biological and nuclear weapons programs were successfully dismantled. How complete and how successful this process was is debatable: the evidence that post-invasion Iraq has produced so far indicates that it was very successful indeed. Was this diplomacy carried out under military threat? Of course it was. But it was carried out without exercising that threat, which is the definition of successful diplomacy.
I have argued elsewhere that the Clinton administration paved the way for the invasion of Iraq by its neglect of the Iraq situation it inherited from the senior Bush administration. Two wrongs, however, do not make a right. It is true that the USA failed to respond appropriately to the expulsion of U.N. Weapons inspectors in Iraq. But the Bush administration demonstrated that it was possible to get the diplomatic process back on the rails through the application of diplomatic pressure and the threat of military force. So far this supports at least part of your argument. But there is another side to the issue of the uselessness of diplomacy without teeth. That is the uselessness of diplomacy without a credible peaceful resolution.
The Bush administration showed a clear inclination towards invasion. It followed the path of diplomacy with reluctance and each concession it made to diplomacy had clear motivations of deflecting domestic and international disapproval rather than of pursuing a genuine desire for peaceful resolution. The massing of troops demonstrated a clear plan for invasion. For those paying attention, the outside time limits for invasion were predicted on the basis of weather realities by various analysts in advance of the invasion: these predictions proved to be accurate. Saddam Hussein was essentially given no incentive to believe that further concessions to efforts of diplomacy would prevent invasion and became increasingly and predictable belligerent. The Bush Administration delivered an ultimatum that would obviously not be answered, which lacked support from the majority of the international community, and invaded. Other than the minute specifics of the timeline, all of this was completely predictable to any individual paying attention to what was said and done around Iraq.
Third and final observation: has the invasion of Iraq made us substantially safer from terroristic threats? (Whatever you might say about the general threat of Iraq to the Middle East region - a threat, incidentally, which is largely unsupported in light of the known military and infrastructure weakness of Iraq demonstrated before, during, and after the invasion - the fact is that you open your argument against diplomacy based on an assessment of the threat of international terrorism represented by Al-Qaeda).
First, let's consider the issue of weapons of mass destruction. Because it simply cannot be forgotton or ignored that the threat of WMD was what was presented to the USA public and the international community as justification for the invasion of Iraq.
Given our failure to find any such weapons in Iraq there are exactly two options: the first is that such weapons didn't exist, in which case we have generated enormous resentment in the Middle East and among Arabs in general, and expended incredible resources that could have been applied to more credible and urgent threats of terrorism, carrying out a military action based on a stated and restated claim of a threat that was at best grossly mistaken, at worst willfully manufactured (in terms of creating greater animosity against the USA - such animosity as supports and nurtures terrorists like Al-Qaeda, it scarcely matters which is true: by exposing ourselves to the worst interpretation through the use of shoddy and spun intelligence we guarantee that the worst interpretation will be used). The second possibility is that such weapons existed and that our military actions have entirely failed to secure them. While pre-invasion Iraq had a justification and military infrastructure for controlling such weapons for agressive or defensive use (as it did in war with Iran), post-invasion Iraq has neither, and lacking the possibility of any further diplomatic bargaining as a sovereign power with the United States, it is reasonable to argue that the invasion of has made the transfer of WMD to terrorists much more likely than it was prior to invasion.
Meanwhile there has never been a greater presence of international terrorists in Iraq.
Meanwhile the invasion of Iraq is credited with creating a wave on nationalist animosity against the USA througout the Middle East.
Meanwhile Osama Bin Laden has not been captured and continues to send his messages to the Muslim world, now using the invasion of Iraq as his rallying point for his call to continue a terrorist war against the USA.
Meanwhile we fail to direct resources to secure the nuclear weaponry of the Soviet Union, nor have we organized homeland security efforts sufficiently to even frame the issue of the security vulnerability represented by the millions of containers shipped by sea and through the porous and poorly controlled borders of Mexico and Canada.
I suggest the policy of preemption be subjected to further scrutiny. What "obviously growing threat" will we "solve" next?
Posted by: n-jath the slave | October 20, 2003 06:07 PM
Hi n-jath; thanks for reading and replying.
To being with, I'll be blunt: if you've got three verbose objections, present them one at a time. Otherwise, you're just avalanching me and anyone else who might be interested in the debate.
It's a matter of protocol on this site, to be sure, but if your goal is to win minds, you'll follow the rule. I have found it's the only route to intelligible debate in this medium: Posit once....then wait.
So, in this reply I'm going to ignore everything but your first point:
No, it didn't. Read what Bush said, read what the administration said (you can do your own research). Every word of it echoes Bush's 2003 SOTU address:
In other words...we must act BEFORE the threat becomes imminent. The "argument from imminence" canard has been uncritically perpetuated by sloppy media coverage, and is in direct conflict with every recorded utterance from the administration. The Bush administration, in fact, relied on the discernment and intelligence of the American polity; it's the media that failed to grasp the distinction.
If you think otherwise, I challenge you to come up with a single primary source instance where Bush or a member of his administration said that Iraq posed an "imminent threat" to America.
The point is not immediacy, and never has been. The point is eventuality. And unless you're prepared to claim that a) the UN sanctions would remain in place in perpetuity, or b) that--once those sanctions were lifted--Hussein would not immediately resume the behaviors that have characterized the entirety of his rule, or c) that it was worth the risk to bet that he wouldn't, you've got no case.
You ask where all the unconventional weapons are. Ask again when the inspectors currently onsite in Iraq have had a chance to examine more than 8% of possible sites.
All of the claims you mention were attempts by the administration to convince the UN that Iraq was defying the UN's own mandates.
But I don't really give a damn about the UN's mandates.
What I care about is denying succor and safe harbor to non-state terrorist organizations, and that denial starts in Iraq.
Again, I attempt to argue from principle. Are you willing to posit some other, more effective way of establishing credible threat of force in the region? If so, name it.
Posted by: --iaw | October 20, 2003 07:20 PM
He also says that "there has never been a greater presence of international terrorists in Iraq" as if it were a bad thing. Where would you rather they be concentrated, n-jath -- Des Moines? Try the "roach motel" analogy for Iraq and terrorists -- maybe that will help.
Posted by: Andrea Harris | October 20, 2003 07:48 PM
I'll take over on points two and three, Ian.
Point 2 paraphrased: "The UNSCOMM and UNMOVIC were working without military intervention." I will try to be nice here and simply recommend that you read to factual items. The Federation of American Scientists (an apolitical organization under any definition of the term) details with liberal links to UNSCOM reports, the failure of UNSCOM here: http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/iraq/deception.htm Secondly, please read the report of David Kay, linked here: http://www.uscrusade.com/forum/config.pl/read/1402
If you can read these two documents and still make the claim that "Iraq's chemical, biological and nuclear weapons programs were successfully dismantled" then we can agree to disagree, but as a non-partisan observer I will conclude that your faculties are clouded by partisanship (which I should have already concluded given your statement that Iraq was described as an imminent threat, demonstrably false).
For example, the Kay report cites the following:
A clandestine network of laboratories and safehouses within the Iraqi Intelligence Service that contained equipment subject to U.N. monitoring and suitable for continuing CBW (chemical biological weapons) research. [undeclared]
– A prison laboratory complex, possibly used in human testing of BW (bioweapons) agents, that Iraqi officials working to prepare for U.N. inspections were explicitly ordered not to declare to the U.N.
– Reference strains of biological organisms concealed in a scientist's home, one of which can be used to produce biological weapons.
– New research on BW-applicable agents, brucella and Congo Crimean hemorrhagic fever, and continuing work on ricin and aflatoxin were not declared to the U.N.
– Documents and equipment, hidden in scientists' homes, that would have been useful in resuming uranium enrichment by centrifuge and electromagnetic isotope separation
Read the whole thing, as they say.
Point 3 paraphrased: "We have failed in the search for weapons and actually aggravated the threat of stateless terrorism while misusing resources that could combat that (the original) threat)."
As to the "failed search", see above. It is simply not true.
As to the trade-off of resources and the effectiveness of the goal, these are your most viable points. WMD vs. securing our borders isn't really an either/or proposition, it is a both/and proposition. I believe that we are making progress in securing our borders from attack, given the political hurdles that must be surmounted; feel free to disagree and I might agree that the progress is not as great as it should be.
As to the effectiveness of the Iraqi invasion in stopping proliferation, I think that it can only be described as a great success. At this time, a stateless actor would need two things to carry out a WMD attack against the US or an ally: 1) the know-how; 2) the equipment. Our invasion of Iraq has taken away the possibility of both. Iraqi scientists will not be at the disposal of an unpredictable dictator. Stateless actors will not be able to procure the sophisticated equipment that formerly could have been sold to Iraq under the "dual use" ruse (we control everything that companies who can provide such equipment could send there).
In closing, I would simply urge you to have a hard and honest look at what is at stake when we are talking about WMD proliferation. The consequences are difficult to imagine, but try. When the consequences of a potential outcome are so catastrophic, even a small risk of such an outcome requires action (a fact that the UN and administration detractors apparently do not appreciate).
OK, I think that covers it. :)
Posted by: Ron C | October 21, 2003 10:53 AM
-iaw: with respect to there being too many points, point taken. With respect to the points being verbose, I don't think this is a situation where sound bites can really address the complex reality.
Your response to my statement that Bush literally argued an imminent threat is pointed and accurate. I was wrong in my statement of that. But I think there is some argument for doublespeak in looking at the statement that immediately follows the statement from the SOTU you cite:
"If this threat is permitted to fully and suddenly emerge, all actions, all words and all recriminations would come too late. Trusting in the sanity and restraint of Saddam Hussein is not a strategy, and it is not an option."
The argument implied is that there is a present threat, not yet fully formed, and that it could emerge "suddenly." I don't think the case was made for this assertion. You ask for "some other, more effective way of establishing credible threat of force in the region." Real evidence of the presence of chemical weapons. Real evidence of the presence of biological weapons. Real evidence of a nuclear program. Real evidence of an intent to arm terrorists.
"You ask where all the unconventional weapons are. Ask again when the inspectors currently onsite in Iraq have had a chance to examine more than 8% of possible sites."
I will. This is a situation more than a dozen years in the making and I don't expect it to be resolved in a few months.
"But I don't really give a damn about the UN's mandates."
Perhaps you should. The USA cannot safeguard the world from terrorism alone. We have to work within these international frameworks. Evidence shows that, when actively and agressively pursued, they can be effective. Let me say this clearly: the Clinton administration failed to apply diplomatic measures backed with a credible threat of sufficient force in 1997 when the inspectors were expelled and I give him equal credit with Bush for the situation in Iraq. But I do not believe Bush gave the process sufficient time nor that he was properly invested in the possibility of an outcome other than invasion.
Andrea Harris - citing the basics of fallacious arguments is sort of an obnoxious habit on the net but sometimes it is the only appropriate response. False compromise and bad analogy. Yes, I do think that Iraq becoming a center of terrorist activity is a bad thing, and not the only alternative to terrorist concentration in Idaho. The roach hotel is a bad analogy. Iraq is full of trained fighters, (at the least) poorly controlled conventional weapons and hostile sentiments against the USA as invaders and empire-builders, right or wrong. It is a good place for terrorists to get armed, trained, and indoctrinated.
Ron C - those are dense resources and I will read them fully and consider the information carefully. I think it is difficult to enter this discussion claiming to be free of partisan sentiments, but I feel I can claim a sincere desire to get to the truth. Speaking of fallacious arguments, yeah, I'm guilty of false compromise in the WMD vs. securing our borders issue. But we are dealing with limited resources, and I do think there is a distraction issue: the focus on Iraq has distracted public discussion from the issue of domestic security. But "liberals" bear guilt for that distraction as well in that they are overly eager to make political hay out of Iraq. Personally I'd rather see the world be made a better, safer place. So far I remain unconvinced that the invasion of Iraq was the best, most important and most timely method of acheiving this goal. But this is some of the better discussion I've gotten on the subject and it's certainly food for thought. I'll let others have last words: I think I've done a decent enough job of voicing some reservations and objections to the invasion and others are doing a good job of response.
Posted by: n-jath the slave | October 21, 2003 11:42 AM
Fantastic! Everybody speaks, no one gets hurt, cookies and punch afterwards. Thanks to Ron for presenting the resources when I didn't have the patience to do so.
OK--here are my last words.
Last year, North Korea "suddenly" emerged as a probable nuclear power, after working on a clandestine program since the great diplomatic success of 1994, that "froze" their development program.
We know that Hussein had the programs. We know that he was willing to use the products of those programs. We know that he was willing to pursue a devastating war with Iran. We know that he was willing to invade Kuwait. We know the oppressive nature of his rule. And we know that he was never going to fully comply with the inspection regimes mandated by the UN, because in 12 years, he never did.
I don't think that we could ever have made the WMD case iron-clad in the face of Hussein's continual obfuscation...just parking 100,000 troops on his borders and waiting wouldn't have accomplished anything.
How does "real evidence" of WMD or intent in Iraq establish the credible threat of force that backs up our diplomacy in the region? I think you may have misunderstood the major thrust of my argument.
The threat of force that we must present is directed towards the other regimes in the region, including Syria, Saudi Arabia, Iran, etc. Iraq was the way to establish that threat and establish a foothold in the region for further action.
My point is that when you add up 1) the possibility of WMD development, 2) the possibility of weapons provision to non-state terrorist organizations, 3) the known harboring of terrorists such as Abu Nidal and the demonstrable support of Palestinian and other terrorist organizations, 4) Hussein's history, and 5) the neccessity of establishing the credible threat of American force in the region, then an invasion of Iraq and the subsequent attempt to create a functioning, prosperous republic becomes the best way of realizing the overall strategy in the war against terrorism.
This was never just about Iraq, and it was never just about WMD. The overall long-term strategic goal is the elimination of regimes in the region that support terrorism. Diplomacy without unequivocal threat of force would never have been sufficient. Even if they never find any WMD whatsoever--and I believe that they will, eventually--deposing Hussein was still a necessary campaign in the overall war.
As for the roach motel analogy: I think there's actually alot to be said for presenting various non-state actors throughout the region with a big juicy target that is not in the US, and that's what the American force concentrations in Iraq are. Every terrorist that gets killed in Iraq foolishly attacking a well-trained, well-equipped American military unit is one less terrorist that can attack an untrained, unequipped civilian in a skyscraper.
And while they may be getting "armed [and] indoctrinated" at the moment, I seriously doubt there's much training going on, and if our gamble pays off, there won't be very much of anything going on in five years.
The "terrorist concentration in Iraq" is temporary, and (I believe) quite intentional. "Bring 'em on," Bush said, in what is typically portrayed as just another cowpoke Dubyaism. What he didn't say is, "...so we know where they are and can kill them."
Posted by: --iaw | October 21, 2003 01:35 PM
I have found the FAS site to be a goldmine of primary source information on the entire Iraqi WMD affair, very useful to those interested in getting at the truth (and I believe that you are). Here is the portal page, read to your heart's content.
[Edited to include HTML link--IAW]
Posted by: Ron C | October 21, 2003 04:43 PM
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